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Abstract 
 
Managerial entrenchment, an undeveloped market for top managerial labor force 
and the absence of clear market signals could prevent owners from firing management for 
poor performance. Top managerial turnover could improve firms’ performance by 
introducing new human capital and providing good incentives for a new manager if the 
previous CEO has been fired for poor performance. We evaluate the effectiveness of self-
enforced corporate governance mechanisms by determining the causes of top management 
turnover and estimating consequences of management turnover on the subsequent 
corporate performance. We track all turnovers of CEO’s in the 110 largest Russian 
companies during a five year period (from 1997 to 2001) and classify each case of 
turnover according to the new position of the prior CEO and the origin of the new director.   3
1. Introduction 
 
Turnovers in the top management of the largest Russian companies occur quite 
often and attract significant attention from society. In theory shareholders, companies’ 
owners (principals), hire managers (agents) and hope that they will do their best to raise 
shareholders’ value. If managers’ performance does not satisfy shareholder expectations, 
owners can punish managers and even dismiss them. In practice everything is more 
complicated. It could be difficult to sack a manager since he could control stock in 
ownership directly or through workers, he could have special information necessary for 
the company’s work or it could be hard to find new managers with appropriate skills in the 
narrow top managerial labor market. Different groups of owners, competitive companies, 
workers and regional and central government are often influence managerial turnover, 
especially in large companies. Studying the behavior of different groups of people 
involved in these processes could help to evaluate the effectiveness of self-enforced 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
One needs to get a lot of information about managerial turnover to understand its 
causes and predict its consequences. That is why we are looking at turnovers in the largest 
public companies where this information is available. We are interested in turnovers of 
only chief executive officers (CEO) and classify cases of turnover taking into account the 
new position of the prior CEO and the origin of the new director. We track all turnovers of 
CEOs in the 110 largest Russian-listed companies during the period from 1997 to 2001. 
Another reason for dealing with the biggest Russian companies is the opportunity to use 
obligatory disclosed financial information, share prices and market capitalization as a 
measure of company performance.  
This paper is organized as follows. A discussion of extensive literature on 
managerial turnover in developed countries and emerging markets and of empirical 
evidence is given in section 2. Section 3 contains sample descriptions and a general 
analysis of managerial turnovers. Detailed turnover classification and some particular 
cases are presented in section 4. Section 5 summaries and contains a conclusion on the 
efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in Russia.    4
2. Literature review 
 
There is strong evidence on negative corporate performance – turnover probability 
relationship. Morck et al. (1989) find that firms experiencing internally precipitated 
managerial turnover perform poorly relative to other firms in their industry. According to 
Weisbach (1988), industry adjusted performance is negatively related to managerial 
turnover. Kaplan (1994a) for US and Japanese firms and Kaplan (1994b) for German 
firms support that poor performance increases the probability of turnover. Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) report similar result for US companies. Warner et al. (1988) relates a 
higher probability of CEO and Board Chairman turnover to low stock returns. All this 
evidence is consistent with hypothesis that shareholders and the board of directors can 
evaluate firm performance and replace managers when firms’ performance is low. 
Evidence the relationship between turnover and subsequent firm performance is 
quite controversial. Most of the evidence comes from event studies. In this approach, the 
impact of a specific event on firm value is analyzed using financial market data 
(MacKinlay (1997)). Top managerial turnover is a good example of such an event. 
Although some authors report significant stock price increase (Weisbach 1988) and 
operating income growth (Denis and Denis 1995) following managerial turnover, others 
find no significant market price reaction (Warner at al. 1988) or find even opposite result 
(Khanna and Poulsen 1995).  
These controversial findings could be explained by high heterogeneity of 
turnovers. Researchers distinguish forced and voluntary turnovers, turnovers resulted from 
internal (dismissals and voluntary turnovers) and external corporate governance 
mechanisms (takeovers). Much attention is paid to the origin of new director (insider 
versus outsider). Johnson et al (1985) show that a CEO’s sudden death may lead to an 
increase in share prices. The effect is stronger if the founder ran the firm, therefore being 
able to expropriate other owners. In this case his replacement is valuable to shareholders.  
Among different types of turnover, forced turnovers with outsider succession are 
considered to have the greatest positive effect on further firm performance (Huson et al. 
(2002), Khurana and Nohria). Under improved management hypothesis, forced turnover   5
increases managerial quality and therefore firm performance. Under the alternative 
scapegoat hypothesis of Holmstrom (1979), managerial quality is the same across 
managers and the difference in performance arises from chance. Under this hypothesis the 
turnover of a poorly performing manager will not change managerial quality but will 
revert subsequent performance to the mean level. Since it is more costly to appoint an 
outsider, outsiders will probably not be appointed unless their expected quality is higher 
than the quality of insiders. (Dalton and Kesner 1985). 
A voluntary or natural turnover followed by an insider succession is the most 
common type of turnover. This type of turnover is not necessarily associated with poor 
performance. Further performance may increase since owners have an opportunity to 
appoint the most capable insider. This kind of turnover can also stimulate top inside 
managers to perform better to be elected as CEO. Overall one can expect performance 
improvement after this kind of turnover, that however should be smaller than after forced 
turnovers with outsider appointment.  
Industry homogeneity, ownership structure, board effectiveness and other factors 
could affect the relationship between performance, managerial turnover and the choice 
between insider and outsider. For example, Parrino (1997) reports that the likelihood of 
forced turnover and of an intra-industry appointment increases with industry homogeneity. 
This evidence is consistent with the argument that poor CEOs are easier to identify and 
less costly to replace in industries that consist of similar firms. Yermack (1996) finds that 
a small board of directors is more effective and provides stronger CEO performance 
incentives from threat of dismissal. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) report a significant 
negative relation between ownership of top executives and the likelihood of top 
managerial turnover. Moreover, managers become entrenched at very low ownership 
levels.  
Undeveloped financial markets and the short history of privatized firms limit the 
evidence on the firm performance – managerial turnover relationship in transition 
economies. Warzynski (2000) finds no relationship between managerial turnover and prior 
performance for Ukrainian firms while Goltsman (2000) finds a positive relationship for 
Russian companies. A possible explanation is that better performing companies are more   6
likely to become takeover targets. At the same time Muravyov (2001) finds “normal” 
negative performance-turnover relationship for Russian companies.  
Several studies of transition economies indicate that managerial changes improve 
firm performance. The large majority of Chinese firms that hired a new manager 
experienced improvement in performance while no improvement was observed when the 
manager was reappointed (Groves et al (1995)). Claessens and Djankov (1999) find that 
managerial turnover is associated with higher profitability and productivity in the Czech 
Republic. Managerial changes together with privatization positively affect firms’ 
profitability in Ukraine (Warzynsky (2000)). Barberis et al. (1996) find that hiring a new 
manager increases the likelihood of the restructuring of Russian shops. 
Among the main factors affecting managerial turnover in Russia, one can highlight 
managerial entrenchment that resulted from rapid insider privatization, a corrupt 
environment, and poor property rights protection and law enforcement.  
The privatization in Russia led to massive self-dealing by managers and controlling 
shareholders. Black et al (2000) argue that in the absence of mature institutions that can 
control self dealing, privatization could not be successful. Similar to the others, Fox and 
Heller (2000), see insider dominance as a main source of corporate governance failures 
that are classified and supported by numerous confirmations from the Russian economy. 
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al (2001) argue that the regional divisions of arbitrage 
courts are corrupt and that governors in alliance with top managers of big industrial 
enterprises use bankruptcy institutions as a mechanism for expropriation of outside 
investors and the federal government. Radygin and Entov (2001) examine a complex 
system of institutional corporate governance problems in Russia. Most of their attention is 
devoted to protection of property rights. This problem is probably the most important in 
Russia up to now.    7
3. Sample description and general turnover analysis 
Sample description 
We track all turnovers of CEOs in the 110 largest Russian listed companies during 
the period from 1997 to 2001. At that time privatization and successive massive ownership 
redistribution were over. The financial market developed dynamically, experiencing a 
boom in 1997, crisis in August 1998 and recovering in 2000-2001. RTS index dynamics 
are presented in figure 1.  
At the end of 2001, shares of about 230 Russian companies were listed on the 
Russian trading system (RTS) - the largest financial ground in Russia
‡. However, most of 
them are illiquid. At the end of the year 2001, the spread (ratio of difference of offers to 
sell and offers to buy) was more than 20% for two thirds of listed companies. During the 5 
years from 1997 through 2001 shares of only one-third of the companies were traded in 
more than 20 months. Number of regularly and actively traded shares is less than 30. 
Some industries are not represented in Russian stock exchange at all (for example the 
wood industry). We study 110 companies whose shares were traded most actively at RTS 
from 1997 till 2001. 
                                                 
‡ Another big market for shares is Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX). Although turnover in 
MICEX is almost 10 times greater than in RTS, shares of more companies are listed in RTS. Until 2000 
turnover on United Energy Systems’ shares was upto 85 percent of total turnover at MICEX. 
Figure 1. Russian financial market experienced boom in 1997, 








Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Dec-00 Jul-01 Dec-01  8
 Companies from this set belong to different industries and are situated in different 
regions. Industry classification is made using 4-digit OKONH. Data aggregated using 3-
digit OKONH is given below. Most companies in our sample are regional 
telecommunications companies. Another big category is regional energy companies. 
Table 1. Most companies in our sample are regional telecommunications or energy companies. 
Code 




11100 Electro  energy  21  19 
11200 Oil  industry    16  15 
12100  Black metal industry   8  7 
14000  Machine building and 
metal working  14 13 
52000 Telecommunications  37  34 
 Other  14  13 
 Total  110  100 
 
Regional coverage of our sample is given in table 2 and figure 2.   
Table 2. Less than one forth of companies in our sample 
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General turnover analysis 
 
From 1997 to 2001 the CEOs of 69 companies changed, while in 41 companies top 
managers kept their position. Often managers changed more than once during that period 
(see table 3).   
Table 3. CEO changed in most companies during 5-year period. 
  No turnover  1 turnover  2 turnovers  3 and more 
turnovers 
# of companies 
observed  41 40 20 9 
# of companies 
modeled  36 45 23 6 
 
Overall we found 113 cases of CEO turnover in 110 companies during the 5-year 
period. Thus managers changed approximately once in 5 years
§.  
We found no long-term tendency in changing turnover intensity (see table 4).  
Table 4. Turnover intensity was lower in 1999 and higher in 2001. 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997-
2001 
#  of  turnovers  23 22 18 22 28  113 
 
Turnover intensity was slightly lower in 1999 and higher in 2001. The decreased 
number of turnovers in 1999 can be attributed to the influence of the crises. Under post 
crisis conditions, it was even more difficult for owners to evaluate managers’ 
performance. Reasons for the increase in turnover intensity in 2001 are discussed below. 
 
 
                                                 
1 One can model the probability of turnover with Bernoulli distribution. Estimates presented in Table 3 are 
made under the assumption that the probability of turnover in every year is constant across companies and 
equal to 20%.      10
 
More than 200 people worked as CEO in the 110 companies during the 5-year 
period. We know the date of birth for almost all of them therefore we can estimate the 
average age of managers and compare it at the beginning and at the end of the period of 
time under examination (see table 5). 
Table 5. Since 1997 managers became younger. 
  December 2001  January 1997 
Average age of CEOs  50  53 
Age of median CEO  50  54.5 
Number of CEO older than 60 years  17  28 
Number of observations  107  100 
As one can see from the table,  managers in general became younger, during the 5-
year period. While in the beginning of 1997 more than quarter of managers were of 
retirement age (in Russia it is 60), at the end of 2001 only every sixth CEO was older than 
60 years. Median and average age of CEOs decreased to 50 years of age.  
 
4. Detailed turnover classification 
 
Using public information about turnovers we can classify each case of turnover 
according to the new position of the prior CEO and the origin of the new director. Thus we 
divide all cases of turnovers into several following groups.  
Honor retirements. 
At the beginning of 1997 many CEOs were of retirement age. Most of them quit 
their jobs during successive 5-year period. We classify 24 cases of turnover as honor 
retirements. Honor retirements are quite predictable. In half of the cases, they take place 
on annual shareholders meetings. Usually CEOs use opportunity to take the vacation 
before retirement. In almost half cases outsiders occupy CEO position. Managers don’t 
retire immediately when retirement age comes but on average 3-4 years later, some even   11
when 70 years old. Most of the CEOs spent a lot of time as CEO of their companies: only 
5 men worked as CEO for less when 5 years, 10 men worked as CEO for more than 10 
years. The experience they got as CEO is very valuable for companies, which is why most 
former CEOs take a place on the board of directors after retirement (11 cases) or even 
head it (7 cases). Most of honor retirements took place in years 2000 – 2001 (10 cases in 
year 2000 and 5 cases in year 2001). One should say that the frequency of honor 
retirements varies across industries. Two thirds of honor retirements occurred in the 
electro energy or telecommunications industries (see table 6). 
Table 6. Probability of honor retirements was lower in oil and black metal industries  
and higher in electro energy industry. 





 of honor 
retirements 
Electro energy  8  21  0.38 
Oil industry   2  16  0.13 
Black metal industry   1  8  0.13 
Machine building and 
metal working  4 14  0.29 
Telecommunications 8  37  0.22 
Other 1  14  0.07 
Total 24  110  0.22 
Managers in oil and black metal industries seldom reach retirement age. We 
highlight two possible explanations. First, these industries are competitive, and it is easier 
for owners to evaluate managers’ performance. Second, these industries have access to 
export markets, thus they are more attractive for investors. This results in higher takeover 
activity and turnover probability.  
Sometimes a CEO is forced to retire, or his retirement is connected with a change 
in the controlling shareholder, as it was in following example.  
GAZ is a large car producer, which experienced a lot of problems after the 
1998 crises. On the 29th of November 2000 president Nikolai Pugin appointed Victor 
Belyaev as GAZ vice president and CEO. On the 20
th January 2001 a GAZ 
shareholder meeting confirmed this decision and affirmed Pugin as GAZ president.   12
Pugin was 60 years old. In Soviet times, he was the minister of the automobile 
industry and a member of the Central Committee of CPSU. The new CEO is an 
outsider. He was supported by the financial industrial group SibAl that recently 
acquired a considerable stake in GAZ equity and took most places in the new board 
of directors. 
Promotions 
CEOs can be promoted either in bigger companies or in government (regional or 
federal). 16 cases of turnovers were promotions. The intensity of promotions during the 5-
year period is presented below. Among recent promotions in government, 3 CEOs became 
members of the Upper Chamber of Russian Parliament and one became a regional 
governor. 
Table 7. It became more attractive for top managers to work in government during last years. 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997-2001 
Government    1 2 0 1 4  8 
Business  1 3 2 2 0  8 
Total  2 5 2 3 4  16 
 
The average age of promoted managers is 52 years. On average they worked as 
CEO for 5 years (It is not surprising that both figures are lower than in the case of honor 
retirements). Promotions are less predictable then honor retirements. In most cases, 
insiders occupy CEO position. 
On the 30
th of January, 2001, the 36 year-old CEO of Norilsky Nickel, 
Alexander Hloponin, got 62% of votes and won the Taimyr regional gubernatorial 
elections. Two days before being sure in victory he appointed Johnson Hagazeev as 
Norilsky Nickel acting director. After one and a half year Hloponin took part in 
Krasnoyarsk region governor elections. On the 22th of September, he won the second 
stage of the elections. However his opponent, head of regional legislative assembly 
Vladimir Us, appealed against the election results. The problem was resolved only by   13
president Putin’s decision. Finally, on the 15
th of October, 2002, Hloponin took 
office as the Krasnoyarsk region’s governor.   
Bankruptcy procedures and external government. 
Federal law #6-FL on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced on the 8th of 
January, 1998. As a result of this law, it was extremely easy to initiate bankruptcy 
procedures. Groups of conflicting owners actively used this law to get control of 
enterprises. It is generally accepted that this law was harmful for Russian industry. Finally 
a new version of the bankruptcy law appeared in 2002, after hot debates in Russian 
Parliament and government. 
Although no one company from our sample went bankrupt in 1997-2001, 5 of them 
experienced periods of external government (2 companies in the oil industry, one company 
in the machine building, electro energy and food industries) with 12 turnovers of CEOs 
and external governors. Most of these turnovers took place in 1998 and 1999 under the 
federal law #6-FL. Each case is unique and has its own peculiarities and outcomes. The 
common thing is a conflict of several groups of owners that battle for control of a firm. 
This struggle results in numerous actions in law, controversial court decisions and frequent 
changes of external governors. For example, during a year, 3 external governors replaced 
each other in Chernogorneft. 
Conflicts 
At the same time one enterprise can have several CEOs and several board of 
directors that make controversial decisions. The legitimacy of these decisions is confirmed 
by one court and appealed by another. The extreme form of such confrontation resulted in 
real battles with police and special forces. Workers and the state are often involved in 
these corporate conflicts. We found that 9 turnovers resulted from corporate conflicts in 8 
companies; 5 of them took place in 2001. 
Restructuring / rearranging 
We found 9 turnovers related to the changing of companies’ organizational 
structure. If in a company, the position of president was liquidated and the positions of 
CEO and chairman were created, then formally we can observe turnover. Another 9   14
turnovers are classified as rearrangements. If one financial industrial group controls 
several enterprises than the CEO of one firm can be rearranged to a similar position in 
another firm or take position in this a FIG. These cases of turnovers are neither promotions 
nor dismissals. They are hardly related to CEO’s performance, but to companies’ 
evolution. 
Other cases 
When a new group of controlling shareholders comes to enterprise it tries to 
change the management team. The old management team knows this and resists takeovers 
together with the old group of controlling shareholders. These processes can take a lot of 
time (see conflicts and external government types of turnover). We found 4 turnovers 
resulting from takeovers. 
Another 3 cases of turnover can be attributed to political reasons and confirm that 
regional governors have power and effect corporate decisions. First, governors can replace 
managers they do not like. Second, governors can prevent managerial turnover. 
We failed to classify 5 cases of turnovers that took place in 1997 due to lack of 
information.   
Dismissals 
All cases of turnovers mentioned above are not directly related to CEO’s 
performance. Only the remaining 22 cases of turnovers are dismissals. In these cases 
owners were not satisfied with the CEO’s performance and succeeded in his replacement. 
However, shareholders usually do not publicly blame retired managers for poor 
performance. Probably it would negatively affect the company’s reputation. In most cases, 
the official reason for turnover is neutral: health conditions, expiration of contract or no 
comments at all. Criminal cases are exceptions. Obviously, it is impossible to hide 
information about poor or even destructive actions by the former CEO in criminal cases. 
In our sample, only twice cases were brought before a court against former CEOs. No one 
was sentenced to imprisonment. 
   15
Rostselmash is the largest combine harvester producer. On the 25th of 
September, 1998, former CEO Vladimir Trinev and commercial director Sergei 
Beloglazov were arrested on suspicion of theft from Rostselmash. They headed the 
company from the end of 1996 untill the beginning of 1998 when they were forced to 
resign because of “health conditions”. The new CEO Pavel Pokrovsky accused them 
of massive self-dealing and transfer pricing. According to Pokrovsky prices of 
combines were significantly lower than costs while materials were acquired at above 
market prices through special structures. Losses from Trinev’s actions were 
estimated to be up to 41 bln. non denominated rubles (approximately $8 mln). 
Investigations took two years and finally the Rostov region Prosecutor exculpated 
Trinev and Beloglazov.          
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
Our examination of CEO turnovers in large Russian public companies from 1997 
to 2001 indicates that managerial turnover activity was quite intensive during this period. 
Table 8 summarizes the turnover classifications discussed in the previous section. For each 
type of turnover we indicate the number of insider and outsider successions.  
Table 8. The probability of outsider succession varies significantly across turnover categories. 




Promotions 16  1  15 
Honor retirements  24  13  11 
Restructuring 18  9  9 
Dismissals 22  11  11 
Politics  3 1 2 
Conflicts  9 6 3 
External government  12  10  2 
Takeovers  4 4 0 
Not  identified  5 1 4 
Total 113  56  57 
It should be noticed that different types of turnover can overlap and this 
classification is rather relative. For example cases formally classified as honor retirements   16
can be associated with ownership changes, (see GAZ case), takeovers, and even dismissals 
(golden parachute story).     
It is not surprising that the probability of outsider succession varies significantly 
across turnover categories. However, on average this probability is close to one half. It is a 
very high figure when compared to developed countries where it is one fifth. This implies 
that top managers have low incentives to perform well since their chances to become CEO 
are low.  
Dismissals is the only category directly related to a manager’s performance. Since 
the share of this kind of turnover in all turnovers is relatively low, one could hardly expect 
to observe a high performance to turnover relationship on the whole sample. 
Our findings suggest that it is really difficult to dismiss managers for poor 
performance. Internal corporate governance mechanisms do not work properly since 
managerial entrenchment is high, an undeveloped financial market complicates manager 
performance monitoring, and the top managerial labor market is thin. The same reasons 
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